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Abstract Will a free trade agreements (FTAs) between nations be politically viable？
Under political lobby what incentives determine whether FTAs will be signed or not?
Will FTAs include steadily more countries until we reach worldwide free trade? The
paper addresses these questions using a theoretical analysis model of free trade
agreement under imperfect competition, with Grossman and Helpman’s “protection
for sale” model as the foundation. The validity of theoretical results is tested by
econometric analysis with a panel probit model. The data spans 25 key trade nations
and covers the period of 2007, 2010 and 2013. It is shown that: the FTA will be
endorsed if and only if the aggregate welfare under FTA, combing lobby
contributions with social welfare of both pair nations, is higher than the counterpart
without FTA. Otherwise, the agreement is rejected. The possibility of concluding a
FTA by a pair of nations has significant positive correlation with both of their market
sizes and the number of countries with which they have both previously concluded
FTAs; the possibility has significant negative correlation with the distance between
pair nations; If both of the pair nations’ market sizes are enough large, the possibility
has positive correlation with government’s sensitivity to social welfare; Otherwise,
the correlation is negative. Although FTAs are characterized by the regionalism, they
will contribute to multilateral free trade in the long run.
Keywords new political economics, free trade agreements, international trade
pattern
JEL Classification D72, F02, F13
1 Introduction
Recently, regionalism has strengthened all around the world. For example, The
United States has concluded bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with Israel,
Canada, and Mexico and will pursue talk with Chile and perhaps other Latin
American countries about Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA). Meanwhile, a lot of
members of the Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been calling
for the formation of East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA). According to the data
published by Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) database of WTO, RTAs have
become increasingly prevalent since the early 1990s. By the end of 2013, some 561
notifications of RTAs had been received by the GATT/WTO. Among these, 323 were
in force. Undoubtedly, bilateral or regional free trade agreements are the main form of
RTAs. The current revival of interest in such FTAs can be characterized as the Third
Regionalism, contrasting it with the First Regionalism that broke out in the latter half
of the 1950s and in the 1960s and the Second Regionalism that broke out in the 1990s.
(Bhagwati, 1993)
The recent revival of interest in “regionalism” especially in the kind of bilateral
or regional free trade agreement sanctioned by Article XXIV of the GATT, has
triggered a parallel revival of academic interest in FTAs. However, the new
theoretical developments are characterized by two entirely different approaches.
(Krishna.P, 1998). One simply asks if nations sign FTAs arbitrarily, what would occur
to their social welfare. And the other asks why such arrangements instead of
multilateral, non-preferential free trade are finally arrived at. Unfortunately, it is
worth noting that most researchers don’t take the political pressures into account,
which are brought to bear on a government as it contemplates whether to enter into a
new trading arrangement. In fact, when an opportunity arises for two countries to
negotiate a FTA among themselves, the more interesting and political economic
theoretic question is that：Will a FTA between these nations be politically viable？
Under political lobby what incentives determine whether FTA will be signed or not?
Are there incentives for FTAs to keep expanding with more members so as to move
toward multilateral free trade eventually or will there be incentives instead to keep
new members out?
In this paper, we take on these questions. Firstly, FTA potential nations’ policy
stances reflect the relative political power of their organized special factor owners and
also the extent of the government's concern for the plight of the average voter.
Secondly, whether FTA will be signed or not is highly affected by government’s
sensitivity to social welfare as well as by economic circumstances, such as market
sizes, the distance and the number of FTAs previously signed, in the nations
considered. Finally, although FTAs are characterized by the regionalism now, they
will contribute to multilateral free trade in the long run. To evaluate the robustness of
our results, a panel probit model is used to test. As we discuss in greater detail later,
the results are highly robust to changes in data handling and econometric
methodology.
The theoretical foundation developed in this paper to motivate estimating models
borrows extensively from the well-known framework of endogenous policy
determination constructed by Grossman and Helpman (1994). In this framework, they
assume a government that trades off its desire to deliver a higher level of welfare to its
polity with its desire for political contributions from organized industry lobbies which,
in turn, provide political contributions to the government so it may move policy in a
direction that would suit them.(Gawande.K, Krishna.P and Robbins.M., 2006) Then
Grossman and Helpman (1995) use above analytical framework to describe what form
the agreement will take under domestic political pressure， which is altered here
suitably to account for the role of foreign lobbies. Other pioneering works were done
by Gawande.K、 Sanguinetti.P and Bohara.A.K (2001) and Endoh (2006) both of
which empirically presented the high explanatory power of their prediction, but still
neglect the existence of the foreign lobbies. Hence we think this paper has been the
only formal study, so far, of economic and political factors which explain the
presence or absence of free-trade agreements between pairs of countries, taking
domestic and foreign lobbies into account.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the analytical
model of imperfect competition with a simplified structure to examine the conditions
under which a bilateral arrangement will be supported by partner countries, and to
investigate the economic and political factors which affect countries’ decisions to
form FTA. Section 3 presents the econometric model and discusses data and
estimation issues in detail. Section 4 describes our results. Section 5 concludes.
2A Three-country Model
2.1 Objectives of Economic and Political Agents
Consider the circumstance in which the world comprises three nations, x(home
nation), y(partner nation) and z(rest of the world). Each of them can choose to sign
FTA with other two nations. The aggregate utility in country j can be assumed to take
the from：
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where 0 jQ is consumption of the numeraire good, good 0, jQ is the total sales of the
imperfect-competition good,
j
A denotes a measure of market size, in nation j. From
the above equation, domestic demand for the imperfect-competition good in nation j
is assumed to take the linear form：
j j j
P A Q= − (2)
where
j
P is the price of the imperfect-competition good.
The numeraire good is assumed to be produced from labor alone by Ricardian
technology with input output coefficient equal to one and is assumed to be freely
traded internationally in perfectly. The imperfect-competition good is presumed to be
produced with constant returns technologies using specific factor, as in Grossman and
Helpman(1994).
Each nation has only one firm which produces the imperfect-competition good.1
The market structure is one type of imperfect competition, with oligopolistic firms
1 Our resulting expressions don’t change if we were to allow for plural firms as in Krishna.P
(1998).
producing goods that perfectly substitute for each other. Recognizing that markets
indifferent countries are segmented, each firm decides the quantity of exports to each
country, taking tariffs and transportation costs into consideration. The equilibrium
concept is that of Cournot–Nash. Under the Cournot assumption, firms are expected
to be maximizing profits by taking other firms’ outputs as given, with all firms
deciding their quantities simultaneously. Firm i chooses the quantity of exports to
country j, i
j
q
, by solving the following problem：
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i
j
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where, i
j
q
is the quantity supplied by a firm in nation i, firm i, to nation j’s market,
i
j
t
is the ad valorem tariff nation j imposes on its import of the imperfect competition
good from nation i, j
i
d
is the transportation cost between nations i and j. The rate of
the import tariff is presumed to be given below the prohibitive level as t or zero.2
Transportation cost is treated under the “iceberg” cost. α is the marginal cost of
special capital.3 Solving and rearranging (3) yields：
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is constant, it is standardized as 1. (4) can be rewritten as：
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where
j
n is the number of FTAs nation j has signed, 0 1 2
j
n = 、 、. Obviously,
,k
j j
k
Q= q k x y z=∑ 、、 . From equations (3) and (4), the profit of firm i gained by
2 The existing papers concerning FTAs, such as Riezman (1985), Kennan and Riezman (1990),
Bond and Syropoulos (1996),Yi (1996), and Bagwell and Staiger (1999), expect the import tariffs
to be adjustable to optimal rates. Here, however, the value of t is treated as given, because there is
little likelihood that FTA member nations will change their external tariffs for the non-member
nations by the formation of a FTA. Thus, the choice of tariff for every nation is simplified to
whether it imposes t or not on its imports.
3 We should note that the assumption here that marginal costs of production are constant is made
just for notational convenience. Different costs cannot impact our result.
supplying the good in the amount of to country j’s market is：
2( )i i
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qπ = . Let the
total profits of firm i from each country’s market be：
i i
k
k
π ,k=x y z∏ = ∑ 、 、 (6)
As is modeled by Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995), trade policy is
determined by interactions between the government and organized lobbies here
representing separately domestic and foreign special factor owners. The government
not only calculates the social welfare but also lobbying contributions. Therefore, the
government’s objective function is expressed as a weighted function in the following
form：
( ) ,i k k
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where social welfare
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is nation
i’s endowment of labor, i∏ is the total firm profit, k k
i i
k
t q∑ is the tariff revenue,
and
i i i
U PQ− is the total consumer surplus.
i
C denotes lobbying contributions by the
domestic lobby I,
j
C
denotes lobbying contributions by organized foreign lobbies, a
is a constant reflecting the government’s preference for welfare relative to campaign
contributions.
Each domestic or foreign firm contributes to its government in order that the
government adopts a trade policy favorable to increasing the firm’s own profit. The
interaction between the various lobbies and the government that we take into account
has the structure of a “menu-auction” problem exactly as in Grossman and Helpman
(1994). Contribution schedule of the lobbies are further presumed to be “truthful”,
which is terminology used by Bernheim and Whinston (1985). It means they
definitely reflect the true preferences of the lobbies because they donate to the
government the excess of the lobby’s gross welfare for any given policy relative to net
welfare B
i
which is endogenously determined and thought as the base level. Formally
i
C can be subject to the following equation：
max 0, ( ) Bi k k
i i i i i i
k
C t q U PQ
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Because there is only one producer in a nation, special capital owners comprise a
negligible fraction of the total number of population. Thus, lobbies can overcome the
“collective action problem” described by Olson.M (1965) and that they work together
for their common political goals. In other words, 0=∂ 。Equations (9) can be expressed
as：
max 0, Bi
i i
C
⎡ ⎤= ∏ −⎣ ⎦ (10)
2.2 Incentive to Conclude FTA
The existing literature all maintained the assumption that a lobby group can offer
contributions only to its own, native government. We allow lobbies in each country to
seek influence over the other's policy. Lobby in every nation that will lose under the
agreement gives donations to each government that exhausts its potential to benefit by
preserving the status quo. This is because each such lobby could block the pact by
swaying either one of the two governments, and no such lobby needs to pay its offer
when both governments actually endorse F=N (regime F denotes FTA is reached. N
denotes FTA is not reached). Furthermore, no lobby that will benefit from the
agreement donates the two governments combined more than what it stands to gain
under the FTA. Finally, we find that an equilibrium outcome with pressured stances in
both countries in support of the regime F requires：
,i j i j i j i j
F F F F N N N N
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Now, we examine the effects of economic and political factors on the incentive
to liberalize trade through concluding a new FTA between countries x and y. For firm
x, as a result of the newly concluded FTA, its profit has changed. The difference in
profit between at
y
n
 + 1 (after the formation of FTA) and at
y
n
(before the
formation of FTA), derives from two effects： x
y
π∆ ,the increase of exports from
country x to country y that increases profit from the new partner’s market, and x
x
π∆ ,
the increase of import from country y to country x, that intensifies competition and
decreases profit from the home market. According to (3), (4) and (5), the two effects
can be expressed as：
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where
x
n
or
y
n
 = 1 if nation x or y has already concluded a FTA with country z and
x
n or
y
n  = 0 if nation x or y hasn’t been concluded. x
y
π∆ is always positive, i.e. the
profit of firm x from the new member market y always increases upon forming a FTA
with it. x
x
π∆ is always negative, i.e. the profit of firm x from the home market always
decreases.
When concluding the new FTA, tariff revenue in country x,
x
TR , decreases and
total consumer surplus in country x ,
x
CS , increases as follows：
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Because of symmetry, the total effects for firm y by FTA can be calculated
similarly. Thus, from (11) to (13), both governments will sign the FTA when the
following inequality is satisfied：
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where 28 6 5t ta t a∇ = − + . Equation (15) implies that the more Λ , the greater the
possibility of a FTA between X and Y conclusion. Equation (15) also indicates that
the range of Λ , which ensures that both governments will increase their policy
objectives by the formation of an FTA, changes with
x y
A A+ ,
x y
n n+ , z z
x y
d d+ , x
y
d
and a。To see this closely, partially differentiate Λ with these factors and we find
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worth noting that according to the results from Goldberg and Maggi(1999)，Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay(2000), a is far greater than zero. From these theoretical
findings, the first set of hypotheses to be empirically examined in the next section can
be stated follows：
Hypotheses I：The possibility of concluding a FTA by a pair of nations increases as
the number of countries with which they have both previously concluded FTAs
increases.
Hypotheses II：The possibility of concluding a FTA by a pair of nations increases as
the distance between them decreases.
Hypotheses III：The possibility of concluding a FTA by a pair of nations increases as
both of their market sizes increase.
As for the other factors, the signs of 4
( )
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z z
d d
x y
δ
δ
Λ
−
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z z x
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δ
δ
Λ
= + + + − + − − − are indeterminate. It can be
seen, though, that if both of the pair nations’ market sizes are enough large, there is a
positive correlation between the possibility of concluding a FTA, and government’s
sensitivity to social welfare relative to its taste for political contributions. If the
market sizes are comparatively small, the correlation will be negative. These findings
support the second set of hypotheses：
Hypotheses IV： If both of the pair nations’ market sizes are enough large, the
possibility of concluding a FTA increases as government’s sensitivity to social
welfare increase. Conversely, the correlation is negative.
3 Econometric Specification, Data and Estimation Methodology
3.1 Econometric Specification
Equation (14) motivates our basic estimating equation. After the introduction of
an additive error term
ε
, it can be expressed as：
( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2 3 4 5)( x y x y xy xz yzn n n A A a n d Infta I I Xd dβ β β β β β α ε+ + + + + ′= + + + + + (15)
Clearly, 1β and 2β are predicted to be greater than zero and 4β is less than zero.
When
x yA A+ is enough large, 3β is greater than zero. Otherwise, 3β is less than
zero.
3.2 Data
Our sample spans G20 nations and other five important trade economies
(Singapore, Columbia, Egypt, Chile and Nigeria).4 Along the time dimension, our
sample covers the period of 2007, 2010 and 2013, which allows our analysis to
capture the effects of the incentives during this period of time. We choose this dataset
to investigate the plausibility of those Hypotheses I-IV, since the amount of GDP of
above 25 nations account for more than 90% of the total world’s GDP and the trade
volume between them account for more than 80% share of the volume of world trade
according to World Bank. Therefore, the sample reflects the situation and
characteristics of world economy and trade comprehensively and objectively. Finally,
the dataset contains 900 observations.
The dependent dummy variable adopts the FTAs notified to the GATT/WTO by
December 2013 and in force at the time. In RTAs database of WTO，there are three
kinds of RTAs： Free trade Agreements (FTAs), Customs Unions (CUs), and “Other”
types of agreements. In FTAs, member nations are required to move trade barriers
among themselves, but can hold their own trade policies toward nonmembers. In
contrast, CUs further require its members to establish a common trade policy toward
nonmembers. “Other” types of agreements, including interim agreements which may
bring about the formation of FTAs or CUs, are all based on an Enabling Clause. The
Enabling Clause allows under-developed nations to form RTAs under less strict
conditions with respect to both the rate of tariff and the coverage of goods. In fact,
many of agreements based on the Enabling Clause haven’t fully been completed yet.
4 The 25 countries included in the econometric model are: USA, Japan, Germany, France, Britain,
Italy, Canada, Russia, Australia, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Chinese, India, Indonesia,
Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Turkey and New Zealand. Here, New Zealand takes the place
of EU.
If we employ a set of dependent dummy variables composed of Enabling Clause, it
may make the dependent dummy variable inaccurate. Thus, dependent dummy
variables have a value of unity for a pair of nations that only conclude a FTA, and 0
otherwise. In addition, managing the FTAs notified to the GATT/WTO as a proxy for
actual FTAs also might lead to discrepancy. However, as there isn’t a precise
definition of actual FTAs, we consider that the difference between the nominal and
actual FTAs is negligible in the case of FTAs.
x yn n+ are the number of nations with which both nations x and y have signed
FTAs, as of December 2007, 2010 and 2013. Data are also from RTAs database of
WTO.
x yA A+ is GDP of nations x and y combined. Here, market size, A, in the
theoretical model, is measured with GDP in this econometric analysis. GDP data are
from the World Bank Indicators database, using the data of 2007, 2010 and 2013.
a is a constant reflecting the government’s preference for welfare relative to
lobby contributions. We take the Gini index as a proxy for a. The index is a measure
of statistical dispersion intended to represent the income distribution of a nation's
residents. A Gini index of zero expresses perfect equality, where everyone, whether
labors or special factor owners, has the same income. A Gini index of one expresses
maximal inequality among values (for example where the a handful of special factor
owners have all the income). In other words, the more Gini index is, the more
sensitive the government is to lobby contributions. Therefore, a is calculated from the
average Gini index of nations x and y.5 Gini index data are also from the World Bank
Indicators database, using the data of 2007, 2010 and 2013.
xyd
is the great circle distance between the capitals of nations x and y. Distance
data are from Geobytes, which is the authoritative website on geography and
Fitzpatrick and Modlin (1986).
xz yzd d+ is the combined distance of nations x and y from the rest of the world.
xzd
,
yzd
are the average distances from nations x and y to the other nations,
5 We should note that the direction of a is converse to Gini index.
excluding the distance between nations x and y, respectively. So,
, ,
23, 23
xz xk yz yk
k x y k x y
d d d d
≠ ≠
= =∑ ∑ . Although the relation between Λ and xz yzd d+ is
indeterminate in above theoretical analysis, the econometric results can help us to
answer whether FTAs will include steadily more countries until we reach worldwide
free trade.
X vector contains time and regional dummy as the control variables. Asia
Europe Africa Latin America and Northern America are the regions considered in the
dummy variables. Dummy variables will have the value of one if a pair of nations
both belong to the one region and zero otherwise. They incorporate the characteristics
of each region.
3.3 Estimation Methodology
Because the dependent dummy variable is binary variable, we use probit of panel
data to perform our econometric analysis. Lagrange Multiplier test for random effects,
following the method of Breusch and Pagan (1980) specifically designed for probit
models, strongly supported the random effects in our data. The Baltagi.Li (1995) test
for first-order serial correlation rejected the hypotheses of serial correlation. In the
section of Sensitivity Analysis, we use the data of 2007, 2010 and 2013 respectively
to check the robustness with probit model.
4 Econometric Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics of our dependent and independent
variables. As can be seen from Table 1, the mean of fta across all the nations in our
sample is 0.2, and the average of
x yn n+ is 9.126 surprisingly. It shows that the
average signature rate of FTAs reaches 20% and the number of FTAs each nation
conclude is more than 4, which reflects the phenomenon of revival of FTAs all around
world. The indicator of market sizes, ( )x yIn A A+ , hits the maximum at 26.16 and
bottom out at 30.8s, standard deviation of which is 0.968. Because the indicator is the
log data, these summary statistics of it imply the significantly difference of market
Table 1 descriptive Statistics
Var obs Mean Std Min 25th Median Max
fta 900 0.200 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
nx+ny 900 9.126 4.398 0.000 6.000 9.000 21.000
In(Ax+Ay) 900 28.530 0.968 26.160 27.874 28.580 30.800
average_gini 900 41.060 6.853 26.500 35.873 40.618 62.640
In(dxy) 900 8.974 0.690 5.838 8.691 9.137 9.895
In(dxz+dyz) 900 9.837 0.107 9.648 9.761 9.830 10.160
sizes among sample nations. The mean of average Gini index is 41.06, which is
higher than the average level of the world, 44.0, implying that compare to other
nations, the sample countries’ government pay more attention to the social welfare.
4.2 Pearson Correlation Test
The results from the Pearson correlation test in Table 2 offer useful hints to our
main econometric analyses to be conducted in the subsequent section. For instance,
x yn n+ , ( )x yIn A A+ are positively correlated with the binary dependent variable fta at
the 1% significance level, which verify the Hypotheses I and III preliminarily.
( )xyIn d is negatively correlated with the binary dependent variable fta at the 1%
significance level, which verify the Hypotheses II preliminarily. average_gini is not
negatively correlated with the binary dependent variable fta at the 1% significance
level, implying that the more government of pair nations pay attention to the social
welfare the higher the possibility of concluding a FTA is. This may not seem
Table 2 Pearson Correlation Test
Var fta nx+ny In(Ax+Ay) average_gini In(dxy) ln(dxz+dyz)
fta 1.000
nx+ny 0.356*** 1.000
In(Ax+Ay) 0.108*** 0.158*** 1.000
average_gini -0.099*** -0.200*** -0.359*** 1.000
In(dxy) -0.352*** -0.043 -0.104*** 0.166*** 1.000
In(dxz+dyz) -0.004 -0.101*** -0.276*** 0.240*** 0.341*** 1.000
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
surprising, as there is significantly negative correlation among ( )x yIn A A+ , x yn n+
and average_gini. Of course, the precise analysis needs to depend on panel probit
model in the next section.
4.3 Panel Probit Model Estimates
Table 3 presents the regression results of a panel probit model. The results based
on all sample observations are listed on all. Similar to the results of Table 2,
x yn n+ , ( )x yIn A A+ are positively correlated with the binary dependent variable fta at
the 1% significance level, which verify the Hypotheses I and III. And ( )xyIn d is also
negatively correlated with the binary dependent variable fta at the 1% significance
level, which verify the Hypotheses II. It is interesting that ( )xz yzIn d d+ is positively
correlated with fta, implying that the possibility of concluding a FTA by a pair of
nations increases if both of them are far away from the rest of the world. Moreover,
absolute value of coefficient of ( )xyIn d is greater than the counterpart of other
variables. Thus, we can suppose that FTAs are still characterized by the regionalism
Table 3 Empirical Results of Panel Probit Model
Var all large_size small_size
nx+ny 1.003*** 2.053*** 0.812***
(9.94) (11.48) (3.52)
In(Ax+Ay) 1.319*** -1.003 3.862*
(3.25) (-1.60) (1.78)
average_gini 0.037 -0.351** 0.344***
(0.62) (-2.12) (3.74)
In(dxy) -6.745*** -12.860*** -6.600***
(-12.90) (-12.93) (-3.67)
In(dxz+dyz) 21.456*** 41.955*** 26.535***
(6.20) (8.91) (2.96)
_cons -208.444*** -316.841*** -311.259***
(-5.59) (-6.52) (-2.78)
dummy Yes Yes Yes
Log-likehood -164.6 -129.6 -31.89
N 900 675 225
Pse_R2 0.1345 0.131 0.2105
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, pseudo-R-squared in Pse_R2.
now. In order to test Hypotheses IV, thresholds were used to determine the
measurement of total market sizes. We take the 25th percentile as the threshold. If
( )x yIn A A+ is larger than the 25th percentile, the relative observations belong to the
sample of large_size. Otherwise, the observations belong to the sample of small_size.
We list the results based on the different market sizes on the last two column. We can
find that if the total market size is large, average_gini is negatively correlated with the
binary dependent variable fta at 5% significance level. By contrast, if the total market
size is small, average_gini is positively correlated with fta at 1% significance level.
Undoubtedly, Hypotheses IV is verified.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to check the robustness of our results, we econometrically analyze the
validity of theoretical results with probit methodology and the data of 2007, 2010
2013 and the pooled cross section, respectively. Table 3A and 3B presents the
regression results. Table 3A does the sensitivity analysis based on all observations.
Table 3B does the sensitivity analysis based on the observations divided on different
market sizes. From results, we can find although ( )xyIn d is negatively correlated with
fta at the 1% significance level from 2007 to 2013, the absolute value of coefficient is
Table 3A sensitivity analysis based on all observations
Var 2013 2010 2007 pool
nx+ny 0.153*** 0.160*** 0.185*** 0.153***
(6.18) (5.86) (5.75) (-10.54)
In(Ax+Ay) 0.162* 0.172* 0.241** 0.171**
(1.47) (1.52) (2.03) (2.66)
average_gini -0.001 -0.00100 0.0110 0.00302
(-0.08) (-0.06) (0.64) (0.33)
In(dxy) -0.867*** -0.867*** -0.933*** -0.880***
(-6.09) (-5.78) (-6.44) (-10.58)
In(dxz+dyz) 2.901*** 3.050*** 2.569** 2.687***
(3.29) (3.34) (2.44) (5.05)
_cons -27.977*** -29.101*** -27.459** -26.06***
(-2.91) (-2.91) (-2.43) (-4.52)
dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likehood -121.2 -107.4 -90.91 -332.61
N 300 300 300 900
Pse_R2 0.267 0.284 0.3101 0.2837
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, pseudo-R-squared in Pse_R2.
declining gradually, implying that FTAs won’t let the world move toward the path of
regionalism in the long run. In other words, according to Hypotheses I, we can
suppose that even FTAs are characterized by the regionalism now, they will
contribute to multilateral free trade in the long run. In addition, the correlation
between average_gini and fta regardless of the market sizes. It implies that attentional
direction by government produces more impact on whether fta is signed or not.
Overall, the results from sensitivity analysis are basically consistent with the above.
Therefore, the results are seen to be quite robust to a variety of sensitivity analyses,
which, in this context, appear to be important in order to make sturdy inferences.
Table 3B sensitivity analysis based on observations divided on different market sizes
Var
large_size small_size
2013 2010 2007 pool 2013 2010 2007 pool
nx+ny 0.186*** 0.219*** 0.239*** 0.194*** 0.099* 0.086* 0.125* 0.095***
(6.06) (5.80) (5.69) (10.40) (1.77) (1.71) (1.71) (3.16)
In(Ax+Ay) -0.128 -0.0690 0.0220 -0.0670 0.755 0.965* 1.383* 0.813**
(-0.80) (-0.40) (0.13) (-0.72) (1.35) (1.80) (1.65) (2.40)
average_gini -0.061* -0.0340 -0.0260 -0.047** 0.024 0.0200 0.0150* 0.026**
(-1.67) (-0.94) (-0.55) (-2.23) (1.32) (1.02) (1.52) (2.38)
In(dxy) -0.923*** -0.929*** -1.081*** -1.006*** -0.913*** -0.894*** -0.995*** -0.825***
(-5.42) (-5.15) (-5.88) (-9.84) (-3.13) (-3.14) (-2.83) (-4.93)
In(dxz+dyz) 3.490*** 3.481*** 3.589** 3.397*** 4.251** 5.031*** 2.239 3.406***
(3.09) (2.94) (2.54) (5.06) (2.22) (2.66) (1.18) (3.14)
_cons -26.157** -26.409** -31.667** -26.313*** -54.363** -68.649*** -52.275* -48.647***
(-2.29) (-2.16) (-2.21) (-3.83) (-2.04) (-2.64) (-1.77) (-3.21)
dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-likehood -93.39 -78.87 -69.72 -248.6 -19.63 -21.34 -14.50 -53.94
N 225 225 225 675 75 75 75 225
Pse_R2 0.347 0.316 0.347 0.312 0.405 0.383 0.377 0.347
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, pseudo-R-squared in Pse_R2.
5 Conclusion Remarks
Our primary interest in this paper is the study of incentives determine whether
FTA will be signed or not under domestic and foreign political lobby. We have
pursued it using a structural methodology where a theoretical framework was
constructed and where the econometric model that followed was linked closely to this
theory. Our results suggest the following conclusions. Firstly, the FTA will be
endorsed if and only if the aggregate welfare under FTA, combing lobby
contributions with social welfare of both pair nations, is higher than the counterpart
without FTA. Otherwise, the agreement is rejected. Secondly, the possibility of
concluding a FTA by a pair of nations has significant positive correlation with both of
their market sizes and the number of countries with which they have both previously
concluded FTAs. Thirdly, the possibility has significant negative correlation with the
distance between pair nations; If both of the pair nations’ market sizes are enough
large, the possibility has positive correlation with government’s sensitivity to social
welfare; Otherwise, the correlation is negative. Finally, Although FTAs are
characterized by the regionalism, they will contribute to multilateral free trade in the
long run.
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